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      The Information Revolution and Soft Power 
 
        By Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 
 
  One of the notable trends of the past century that is likely to continue to strongly 
influence global politics in this century is the current information revolution.  And with it 
comes an increase in the role of soft power – the ability to obtain preferred outcomes by 
attraction and persuasion rather than coercion and payment.  
Information revolutions are not new – one can think back to the dramatic effects of 
Gutenberg’s printing press in the 16th century – but the current information revolution is 
changing  the  nature  of  power  and  increasing  its  diffusion.  The  current  information 
revolution,  sometimes  called  “the  third  industrial  revolution,”  is  based  on  rapid 
technological  advances  in  computers  and  communications  that  in  turn  have  led  to 
dramatic decreases in the cost of creating, processing and transmitting, and searching for 
information. One could date the current information revolution from Moore’s Law in the 
1960s -- the capacity to double the number of transistors on a computer chip every 18 
months.  As  a  result,  computing  power  doubled  every  couple  of  years,  and  by  the 
beginning of the twenty-first century it cost one-thousandth of what it did in the early 
1970s.  In  1993,  there  were  about  50  websites  in  the  world;  by  2000,  that  number 
surpassed 5 million. Today, about a third of the world population is online; by 2020 that 
is projected to grow to 60 percent or five billion people, many connected with multiple 
devices.  
The  key  characteristic  of  this  information  revolution  is  not  the  speed  of 
communications  between  the  wealthy  and  powerful:  for  a  century  and  a  half 
instantaneous communication by telegraph has been possible between Europe and North 
America.  The  crucial  change  is  the  enormous  reduction  in  the  cost  of  transmitting 
information.  If  the  price  of  an  automobile  had  declined  as  rapidly  as  the  price  of 
computing  power,  one  could  by  a  car  for  $10-15.    When  the  price  of  a  technology 
declines so rapidly, it becomes readily accessible and the barriers to entry are reduced. For all practical purposes, transmission costs have become negligible; hence the amount 
of information that can be transmitted worldwide is effectively infinite. In the middle of 
the  twentieth  century,  people  feared  that  the  computers  and  communications  of  the 
current information revolution would create the central governmental control dramatized 
in George Orwell’s dystopian novel 1984. Instead, as computing power has decreased in 
cost and computers have shrunk to the size of smart phones and other portable devices, 
their decentralizing effects have outweighed their centralizing effects.  
Power over information is much more widely distributed today than even a few 
decades ago. Information can often provide a key power resource, and more people have 
access to more information than ever before. As I describe in The Future of Power, this 
has lead to a diffusion of power away from governments to non-state actors ranging from 
large corporations to non-profits to informal ad hoc groups. This does not mean the end 
of the nation-state. Governments will remain the most powerful actors on the global 
stage, but the stage will become more crowded. And many of those other actors will 
compete effectively in the realm of soft power. The increasingly important cyber domain 
provides a good example. A powerful navy is important in controlling sea lanes;  it does 
not provide much help on the internet. The historian A.J.P. Taylor wrote that in 19th 
century Europe, the mark of a great power was the ability to prevail in war, but as 
John Arquilla notes, in today’s global information age, victory may sometimes 
depend not on whose army wins, but on whose story wins.  
  I first coined the term “soft power” in my 1990 book Bound to Lead that 
challenged the then conventional view of the decline of American power. After 
looking at American military and economic power resources, I felt that something 
was still missing – the ability to affect others by attraction and persuasion rather 
than just coercion and payment. I thought of soft power as an analytic concept to fill 
a deficiency in the way analysts thought about power.  It was eventually used by 
European leaders to describe some of their power resources, as well as by other 
governments such as Japan and Australia. But I was more surprised when Chinese 
President Hu Jintao told the 17th party Congress of the Chinese Communist Party in 
2007 that China needed to increase its soft power. This is a smart strategy because 
as China’s hard military and economic power grows, it may frighten its neighbors into balancing coalitions. If it can accompany its rise with an increase in its soft 
power, China can weaken the incentives for these coalitions. Consequently, the 
Chinese government has invested billions of dollars in that task, and Chinese 
journals and papers are filled with hundreds of articles about soft power. But what 
is it?  
Power is the ability to affect others to obtain the outcomes you want. One can 
affect their behavior in three main ways:  threats of coercion (“sticks”); inducements 
or payments (“carrots”) and attraction that makes others want what you want. A 
country may obtain the outcomes it wants in world politics because other countries 
want to follow it, admiring its values, emulating its example, aspiring to its level of 
prosperity and openness.  In this sense, it is also important to set the agenda and 
attract others in world politics, and not only to force them to change through the 
threat or use of military or economic weapons. This soft power—getting others to 
want the outcomes that you want— co-opts people rather than coerces them. 
 Soft power rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. It is not 
the possession of any one country, nor only of countries. For example, companies 
invest heavily in their brands, and non-governmental activists often attack their 
brands to press them to change their practices.  In international politics, the soft 
power of a country rests primarily on three resources:  its culture (in places where 
it is attractive to others), its political values (when it lives up to them at home and 
abroad), and its foreign policies (when they are seen as legitimate and having moral 
authority.)          
China has always had an attractive traditional culture, but now it has created 
hundreds of Confucius Institutes around the world to teach its language and culture, 
and China is increasing its international radio and television broadcasting. 
Moreover, China’s economic success has attracted others, and this has been 
reinforced by it successful response to the 2008 financial crisis. In addition, China 
has reinforced its attraction by economic aid to poor countries. In the last decade, it 
became common to refer to these efforts as “China’s Charm Offensive.”  But as Jing 
Sun explained in the September issue of Current History, and as recent polls show, 
China has not reaped a good return on its investment. This is not because soft power is becoming less important in world politics, but because of limitations in China’s 
strategy which overly stresses culture, and neglects civil society and the damage 
done by nationalistic policies.  
China’s soft power still has a long way to go as measured by recent 
international polls. China does not yet have global cultural industries on the scale of  
Hollywood, and its universities are not yet the equal of America’s, but more 
important, it lacks the many non-governmental organizations that generate much of 
America’s soft power. Chinese officials seem to think that soft power is generated 
primarily by government policies and public diplomacy, but much of America’s soft 
power is generated by its civil society rather than its government.  
In 2009, Beijing announced plans to spend billions to develop global media 
giants to compete with Bloomberg, Time Warner and Viacom to use soft power 
rather than military might to win friends abroad. As David Shambaugh has 
documented, China has invested billions in external publicity work including a 24 
hour Xinhua cable news channel designed to imitate Al Jazeera.  But for all its 
efforts, China has had a limited return on its investment. A recent BBC poll shows 
that opinions of China’s influence are positive in much of Africa and Latin America, 
but predominantly negative in the United States, everywhere in Europe, as well as 
India, Japan and South Korea. Similarly, a poll taken in Asia after the Beijing 
Olympics found that China’s charm offensive had not been effective. Great powers 
try to use culture and narrative to create soft power that promotes their advantage, 
but it is not an easy sell when it is inconsistent with their domestic realities.  
 For example, the 2008 Olympics was a great successes, but shortly 
afterwards, China’s domestic crackdown in Tibet, Xianjiang, and on human rights 
activists undercut its soft power gains. The Shanghai Expo was also a great success, 
but was followed by the jailing of Nobel Peace Laureate Liu Xiaobo and the artist Ai 
Wei Wei. In the world of communications theory, that is called “stepping on your 
own message.”  And for all the efforts to turn Xinhua and China Central Television 
into competitors for CNN and the BBC, there is little international audience for 
brittle propaganda. As The Economist  reported, “the party has not bought into Mr 
Nye’s view that soft power springs largely from individuals, the private sector, and civil society. So the government has taken to promoting ancient cultural icons whom 
it thinks might have global appeal.”  
Given a political system that relies on party control, it is difficult to tolerate 
dissent and diversity. Moreover, as the party has based it legitimacy on a high rate of 
economic growth and appeals to nationalism, it not only reduces the universal 
appeal of “the Chinese Dream”, but it encourages policies in the South China Sea and 
elsewhere that antagonize its neighbors.  For example, when Chinese ships drove 
Philippine fishing boats from the Scarborough Shoals last year, China gained control 
of the remote area, but at the cost of reduced Chinese soft power in Manila. But from 
a domestic nationalist point of view, the action was a success.   
Vladimir Putin has recently called for an effort to increase Russia’s soft 
power, but he might consider these Chinese lessons the next time he locks up 
dissidents or bullies neighbors such as Georgia or Ukraine.   A successful soft power 
strategy must attend to all three resources of culture, political values and foreign 
policies that are seen as legitimate in the eyes of others. Investment in government 
propaganda is not a successful strategy to increase a country’s soft power. The best 
propaganda is not propaganda.  
The development of soft power need not be a zero sum game. All countries 
can gain from finding attraction in each other. Just as the national interests of China 
and the United States are partly congruent and partly conflicting, their soft powers 
are reinforcing each other in some issue areas and contradicting each other in 
others. This is not something unique to soft power. In general, power relationships 
can be zero or positive sum depending on the objectives of the actors. For example, 
if two countries both desire stability, a balance of military power in which neither 
side fears attack by the other can be a positive sum relationship. If China and the 
United States, for example, both become more attractive in each others’ eyes, the 
prospects of damaging conflicts will be reduced. If the rise of China’s soft power 
reduces the likelihood of conflict, it can be part of a positive sum relationship. In the 
long term, there will always be elements of both competition and cooperation in the 
US-China relationship, but the two countries have more to gain from the cooperative element and that can be strengthened by the rise in both countries’ soft power. 
Prudent policies would aim to make that a trend in this century.  
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